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ANTITRUST LAW -
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VERSIFIED MANUFACTURER'S ACQUISITION OF LEADING PRODUCER
IN OLIGOPOLISTIC MARKET HELD UNLAWFUL UNDER SECTION 7
OF CLAYTON ACT. - Respondent, a large, diversified manufacturer
of household products, acquired the assets of Clorox, the nation's
leading producer of liquid bleach. The United States Supreme

Court, affirming the Federal Trade Commission's order of divestiture, held that such a product-extension merger, in an already

highly concentrated market, was unlawful under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act. The Court's conclusion was based upon two
fundamental grounds:
(1) the probable anti-competitive effect
created by the superior advertising and production benefits which
the acquirer enjoyed, in comparison to other liquid bleach producers; and, (2) the elimination of market competition by the
destruction of the acquirer as a potential competitor. Federal Trade
Commission v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, although originally enacted
to apply to stock acquisitions rather than pure asset acquisitions
or mergers, was amended in 1950 to include all mergers or
acquisitions which substantially lessen competition.' Since the purpose of Congress was to combat all anti-competitive practices, it
intended the amended statute to be applicable, when appropriate,
to all types of mergers and acquisitions, whether vertical, horizontal
or conglomerate.2
A horizontal acquisition occurs when one
company acquires the stock or assets of a competitor in the same
product or service market.3 A vertical merger occurs when the
acquiring firm is an actual or potential customer or supplier of the
The appropriate provisions of section 7 are:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or
indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share
capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal
Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the
assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where
in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the
effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.
64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. §18 (1958), amending 38 Stat. 731
(1914) (emphasis added).
2 2 U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. Nmvs 4293 (1950).
3 Blair, Thw Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 GEo. L. J.
672 (1958). See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
1
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acquired firm.4 Finally, a conglomerate merger occurs when neither
a horizontal nor vertical merger is present, i.e., when there is
neither direct competition nor a buyer-seller relationship.5
Although the extended coverage of the Clayton Act had been
available since 1950, it was not until Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States 6 that the Supreme Court first established criteria for other
than stock acquisitions. The facts in Brown were characteristic
of a vertical merger between the nation's fourth largest shoe
manufacturer and a retailer owning and operating the nation's
largest independent chain of family shoe stores. Moreover, the
merger appeared to have horizontal aspects since it involved two
potentially competing shoe retailers operating in different geographic
markets at the time of the merger. In declaring this horizontalvertical merger to be unlawful under section 7, Brown developed
practical guidelines for judicial analysis of a merger's anticompetitive effects. The Court indicated that the fundamental principle to be used in determining whether a merger tended to substantially lessen competition would be its reasonable probability
rather than its certainty to create such an effect. Thus, clearcut infringements on competition were not necessary for a section 7
violation.7

The Court in Brown also identified certain factors to be
considered in determining the probable effects of a merger: the
particular industry," the size and structure of the acquiring firm,9
the concentration within the particular industry, 10 the purpose of
the merger, 1 and the opinions of competitors in the relevant
markets as to the anti-competitive effect of the merger. 2 By
4 Blair, supra note 3. See United States v. E. I. duPont de Nemours
& Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
5 It is important to note that conglomerates may range from the pure
conglomerate, involving no economic relationships between the businesses of
acquired and acquiring firms, to the mixed conglomerates where some
aspects of horizontal or vertical mergers are present. The category also
includes acquisitions of a company manufacturing a different product
which is, nevertheless, related to a product or products of the acquiring
company because it can be sold through the same distribution channels,
or made a part of the same research and development techniques. Turner,
Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv. L. Rv.
1313, 1315 (1965).
6370 U.S. 294 (1962).
7Id. at 323. See also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
376 U.S. 651 (1964).
8 370 U.S. at 322.
9 Id. at 344.
1l Id. at 345.
11 Id. at 329.

12 Id. at 344. "[O]nly a further examination of the particular marketits structure, history and probable future--can provide the appropriate
setting for judging the probable anticompetitive effect of the merger."
Id. at 322 n.38.
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inference, the Court extended this probable effect theory to conglomerate mergers as well-section 7 applied "not only to mergers
between actual competitors, but also to vertical and conglomerate
mergers whose effect may tend to lessen competition.
...
13
Even with such standards, however, the primary importance
of Brouu appeared weakened when applied to conglomerates because
of the differing views as to the economic effect of a conglomerate
merger.' 4 In one attempt to develop standards for judging conglomerates, a lower federal court apparently determined the lawfulness of a conglomerate merger under section 7 by weighing
the benefit accruing from the acquisition against the disadvantages
of any anti-competitive effect. 15 In this case, Lever Brothers, a
leading soap manufacturer, acquired the rights to a low sudsing
detergent from Monsanto Chemical Company. Until the time of
the merger, Lever had been unsuccessful in its attempts to market
such a detergent. In deciding that there was no violation of
section 7, the court found an appreciable benefit to competition
due to the fact that Monsanto was preparing to drop this product
from its
line because of its inability to market the detergent at a
6
profit.'
Further confusion arose as to the applicability of section 7
to conglomerate mergers due to the Supreme Court's hesitancy to
designate seemingly conglomerate mergers as such. Rather, the
Court preferred to avoid the problem by designating these mergers
as vertical or horizontal wherever possible. An example of this7
can be found in United States v. Aluminum Co. of AmericaJ
In this case, at the time of the acquisition, the acquirer was the
nation's largest producer of aluminum, while most of the acquired
firm's sales were of copper products. In the field of aluminum
conductors, Alcoa, the acquirer, produced 27.8 percent of the nation's supply, whereas Rome, the acquired company, produced 4.8
percent of the supply. The district court treated the merger as conglomerate but upheld its lawfulness on the ground that bigness
produced by a conglomerate merger, in the absence of evidence
of the abuse of power because of such size, is not in violation of
section 7.18 The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding the
merger to be horizontal despite its apparent conglomerate aspects.
The Court considered the relevant market to be aluminum con'3Id. at 317.

4
1 Address by Paul Rand Dixon,
Section of American Bar Association,
It50,143.
"sUnited States v. Lever Bros.,
16Id. at 898. The court stressed

Chairman F.T.C. Before Anti-Trust
April 14, 1966, in 5 TRADE REG. RF.
216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
that it was Lever's efficiency rather

than its financial status which made the merger advantageous.
17 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
38214 F. Supp. 501, 515 (N.D.N.Y. 1963).
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ductors and held such a dramatic increase in the leading firm's
share of the market to be anti-competitive and violative of
section 7.19
Another example can be found in United States v. Continental Can Co., 20 wherein a leading metal container manufacturer
merged with a major producer of glass bottles. The district court,
in light of the Brown decision, held that the merger was not a
violation of section 7 because there still remained formidable
competition in each respective line, i.e., bottles and cans. 21 The
Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower court, viewing the
relevant product of the acquiring and acquired firms not to be
bottles or cans but, rather, drink containers. By construing the
merger to be horizontal, thereby avoiding conglomerate litigation,
the Court found the increased percentage of the market obtained
to have an adverse effect upon competition in violation of
section 7.22
Reluctance to meet the issue of conglomerate mergers directly
did not, however, prevent conglomerate implications from arising
when other types of mergers were at issue. For example, in
Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC,2s a leader in the aluminum industry
acquired Arrow-Bonds Inc., a producer of aluminum "florist" 24
foil. The court, in finding this to be an unlawful vertical merger,
based its decision on the wealth of Reynolds and its ability to
use a price war in order to eliminate competition. It was the
court's contention that a merger is anti-competitive and violative
of section 7 if the newly-formed firm has the economic strength to
eliminate or to attempt to eliminate competition through techniques
such as price-cutting. 25 Unlike the standards of Brown, excluding,
of course, probable cause, the Reynolds criteria, because of the
broad language used, did not appear to be limited in application
to vertical and horizontal mergers.26
Again, in 1964, the Supreme Court indirectly established another criterion for determining a conglomerate merger's anti19377 U.S. at 278.

20378 U.S. 441 (1964).
21217 F. Supp. 761, 765 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).

22378 U.S. at 461. The Court in the Alcoa and Continental Can cases
thus respectively restricted and expanded the market, leaving undetermined
the difficult question of a conglomerate merger under section 7. Hrusoff,
Conglomerate Mergers, Joint Ventures, Market Extensions and Section 7 of

the Clayton Act, 69 Dicx. L. REv. 113, 120 (1965).
23309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
24 The acquired firm converted raw aluminium foil into a specialized

by-product

(green

florist foil).

Thus, the

supplier-supplied aspects of

a vertical merger arise.
25309 F.2d at 229-30.
26 For a detailed study of the applicability of this test to conglomerates,
see C. KAYSEN & D. TuRNF, ANTITRUST PoucY 134-35 (1959).
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competitive effect. In United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,2
the Court was confronted with what was considered to be a marketextension merger.2- El Paso had purchased 99.8 percent of the
stock of Pacific Northwest, a leading midwest pipeline corporation.
Prior to the merger, the acquirer supplied more than 50 percent of
all gas consumed in California, while the acquired company bought
gas from several areas in and outside of the United States, excluding California. The Court, deciding that the acquisition had a
sufficient tendency to substantially lessen competition in California,
held the merger unlawful since it had, within the Brown standard,
a probable anti-competitive effect. In explaining the Brown standard, the Court stated that the mere foreclosure of potential competition was sufficient to establish a section 7 violation. 29 Neither the
existence of competition, nor its reduction was necessary to determine
the merger's lawfulness.3"
Thus, by 1965, certain basic principles had evolved concerning
the lawfulness of mergers under section 7 which were applicable
by implication to conglomerate mergers. The Brown principle of
reasonable probability of anti-competitive effect had been clarified
by the "bigness" and "price-cutting" tests of Reynolds and the
"potential entrant" test of El Paso. With these basic formulations,
the Supreme Court, for the first time, determined the legality of
a true conglomerate merger under section 7.

27376 U.S. 651 (1964).
28A market extension

is created by the integration of two firms selling
similar products, but in different geographical areas. It is analogous to a
horizontal merger in that the principal firm is acquiring a sister firm and
is similar to a pure conglomerate in that it neither involves competing firms
nor does it foreclose competition. Hrusoff, Conglomerate Mergers, Joint
Ventures, Market Extensions and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 69 Dicx. L.
REv. 113, 133 (1965).
29 376 U.S. 651, 658-59 (1964).
-0 In United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), the
same conclusion was reached concerning two firms engaged in a joint venture.
Here, twro large producers of chemicals and chemical products formed a
joint venture to enter a highly concentrated market for the production of
sodium chlorate. Both companies had considered entering individually prior
to the formation of the joint venture. The district court found for the
defendants on the ground that the government had failed to establish proof
of both firms' intent to enter the market. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded, holding that the district court had failed to consider a
"reasonable probability" that one company would enter the market while
the other would remain a significant potential competitor. The Court felt
that this potential entrance into such an oligopolistic market was a substantial
incentive to competition among those actually engaged in the market since
"'[p]otential competition . . . as a substitute for . . . [actual competition]
may restrain producers from overcharging those to whom they sell or underpaying those from whom they buy...."' Id. at 174.
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In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp.,3 1 Consolidated, the
acquiring firm, was a diversified processer and seller of food
products, while Gentry Inc., the acquired firm, was a leading manufacturer of onion and garlic salts in an oligopolistic market.3 2
Although the firms, prior to merger, were not competitors, the
Court held the merger unlawful under section 7. The Court
reasoned that such an acquisition might have the effect of solidifying
and protecting Gentry's market share because of the possible
reciprocal arrangement that might flow from this merger, i.e., the
acquired firm's position in the market would be strengthened
because of the leverage given to it by affiliation with Consolidated.
Stressing reciprocity as the basis for the section 7 violation, the
Court was primarily concerned about the probable pressure that
might be applied on middlemen who would be forced to buy from
the acquired company if they desired to continue selling to the
acquirer. In construing a reciprocal arrangement not to be unlawful in and of itself, 33 the Court also emphasized the importance
of the position of the acquired firm before merger. If the acquired
firm, prior to merger, controlled a substantial share of the market,
the probability was increased that a reciprocity agreement would
have anti-competitive tendencies and be in violation of section 7.
Although failing to incorporate in its decision all of the earlier
principles potentially applicable to conglomerate mergers, Consolidated was, nevertheless, the vitally needed starting point for
conglomerate litigation in the Supreme Court. Thus, following
the precedent established by Consolidated, and the principles developed by Brown, Reynolds and El Paso, the Supreme Court, in
1967, again brought into" issue the lawfulness of a conglomerate
merger under section 7.
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co.,34 the Supreme Court was
confronted with a conglomerate-type merger between Procter &
Gamble and Clorox, the former acquiring the assets of Clorox

380 U.S. 592 (1965).
32At the time of merger, Gentry held 32% of the relevant market and,

together with its leading competitor, held approximately 90% of the market.
Id. at 595.
1 33The essence of a reciprocity arrangement "is the willingness of each
company to buy from the other, conditional upon the expectation that the
other company will make reciprocal purchases ....
[W]here such a relationship is established, it prevents the competitors of each company from selling to

the other company, and affords to each company whatever increase of size
and strength can be derived from an accrued place as supplier to the other."
C. EDwARDs, CONGLOmRATE BrNEsS AS A SOURCE OF PowER, BusInESS
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 332 (1955).
34386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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in exchange for Procter stock. At the time of merger, Clorox
was the leading manufacturer in a heavily concentrated industry.35
Liquid bleach was considered to be a distinctive product, and
since all such bleach could be considered chemically identical,
sale of the product was highly dependent upon advertising and
other sales promotions. Procter, a large, diversified manufacturer
of household products, at the time of the acquisition did not
produce liquid bleach although such a product would have been a
natural addition to its product line and its addition had been
contemplated. Furthermore, as a large company with a tremendous
volume of sales and advertising, Procter received substantial discounts from the advertising media.
The Federal Trade Commission ordered divestiture of Clorox
upon the finding of a substantial anti-competitive effect of the
merger on the already highly concentrated industry. 36 The Commission found that the threat posed by a new entrant in a
product field frequently acted as a restraint upon the pricing
power of the oligopolists. It found that the present merger
destroyed this restraint and, therefore, healthy competition, because
of the considerable advertising and promotional advantages that a
multi-product firm such as Procter enjoyed. The Commission also
emphasized the greater market power of Procter in comparison
to Clorox and indicated that the combination of the "bigness"
of Procter & Gamble and the well established name of Clorox
would be such a deterrent to new entrants in this market that the
mere ability to use this competitive advantage was violative of
section 7. Finally, the Commission found the elimination of
Procter as a potential entrant anti-competitive because of the
fact that the acquirer, absent the merger, would have counterbalanced
any attempt by Clorox to increase its own market
37
control.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, reversed the
Commission's order of divestiture. The court believed that the
35At the time of acquisition, Clorox was the leading manufacturer with
48.8% of the market. Due also to the high concentration of the industry,
Clorox and Purex, its leading competitor, accounted for almost 65% of
the nation's sales of liquid bleach. Id. at 571.
38 Procter & Gamble Co., 3 TRADE REG. REP. (1963-65 Transfer Binder)
1f16,673 (FTC 1963).
3 It is important to note that in an FTC case decided one year later,
the Commission held a similar merger to be unlawful predicated upon its
ruling in Procter & Gamble. In General Foods Corp., a merger took place

between General Foods and S.O.S., a manufacturer of steel wool. As a
result of this merger, S.O.S. was able to take full advantage of the
acquirer's advertising discounts. Because it was demonstrated that S.O.S.,
after the merger, was able to increase substantially its market share, the
conglomerate was considered to be a section 7 violation. 3 TRADE REG. REP.
(1963-65 Transfer Binder) 1 17,161 (FTC 1964).
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Commission's contentions of illegality were based on "treacherous
conjecture," mere possibility and suspicion.38 It indicated that the
oligopolistic nature of the market, with Clorox as the leader,
was of little impact since the existence of two-hundred smaller
producers "would not seem to indicate anything unhealthy about
the market conditions." 39 The court also rejected the possibility
of the acquirer using its advertising budget and volume discounts
to push Clorox, finding "it difficult to base a finding of illegality
on discounts in advertising."40 Furthermore, the court dismissed
the Commission's contention that Procter had been eliminated as a
potential competitor, finding this to be merely conjectural since
"[t]here was no evidence tending to prove that Procter ever
intended to enter [the liquid bleach] field. . . .",'
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision
and affirmed the agency's order of divestiture. Reaffirming the
position in Brown, Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority,
stated that section 7 was intended to arrest any substantial anticompetitive effects of market power at their inception.4 2 Because
the products and the marketing and advertising of the acquired
company were complementary to those of the acquiring company,
the Court categorized the merger as a product-extenSion43 rather
than a purely conglomerate merger. The Court construed the
Procter merger to have two basic anti-competitive effects: first,
substitution of a large, experienced corporation for a smaller, but
already dominant firm and thereby reducing competition and dissuading the smaller firms from competing; and secondly, the
elimination of Procter as a potential competitor."
In explanation of its first contention, the Court indicated that
there was every reason to believe that the smaller firms would be
more cautious in their competition with Procter due to a fear of
retaliation, inevitably leading to a more rigid oligopoly with Procter
becoming the price leader. Moreover, entrance barriers into the
liquid bleach market would be heightened since Procter, because of
its size and wealth, enjoyed advantages which Clorox did notProcter could divert a large portion of its resources to meet shortterm threats of new entrants by price wars and large scale advertising campaigns. Also, because of Procter's ability to incorporate
Clorox's bleach manufacturing into its experienced production and
advertising techniques, the merged firm's market advantage, in an
38

Procter & Gamble v. FTC, 358 F2d 74, 83 (6th Cir. 1966).

39 Id. at 80.
40 Id. at 81.
41 Id. at 82.
42 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 577 (1967).

43See supra note 28.
44386 U.S. at 578.
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industry where 45such advertising is so vital, appeared to be almost
insurmountable.
In support of its second conclusion, the Court found that the
existence of Procter as a potential competitor had considerable
influence on the market since the market's behavioral patterns were
based on the actions of competitors, both actual and potential.
The apparent ability of Procter to enter the market would force
the competitors to keep the price of liquid bleach at a reasonable
level since a high price for bleach would increase the number of
entrants, thereby decreasing the profits of already competing firms.
Moreover, since the oligopolistic nature of the industry tended
to be conducive only to a few financially stable competitors, the
Court considered the elimination
of one to have a significant
46
influence upon market flexibility.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Harlan evidenced his
concern about the need for a very careful treatment of conglomerates because of the advantages as well as disadvantages inherent
in them.4 7 He particularly took issue with what he considered to
be a res ipsa loquitur approach in the comparatively new field of
conglomerate adjudication. It was his contention that, although
the Court properly adhered to the standard of probable anticompetitive effect as it was announced in Brown, it made no
attempt to define, for the benefit of the businessman, what was a
substantialprobable anti-competitive effect. Additionally, Mr. Justice
Harlan stated that, in lieu of Procter's reluctance independently to
enter the liquid bleach industry, the Court should have made a
reasoned analysis
as to the effect, if any, of potential competitors
48
in the industry.
In the opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, there exist four
important principles which should be utilized by the courts in
determining the lawfulness of conglomerate and product-extension
mergers under section 7.
First, the decision can rest on analysis of market structure without
resort to evidence of post-merger anti-competitive behavior. Second,
the operation of the premerger market must be understood as the
45
1d. at 579. For a look at other FTC reports similarly concerned about
advertising advantages, see Blake & Blum, Network Television Rate Practice:

A Case Study in the Failure of Social Control of Price Discrimination,

74

YALE

L.J. 1339 (1965).

46386 U.S. at 580-81.

4 Mr. Justice Harlan stated: "A conglomerate case, however, is not
only too new to our experience to allow the formulation of simple rules
but also involves 'concepts of economic power and competitive effect that
are still largely unformulated.' This makes clear the need for 'full inves-

tigation and analysis, whatever the cost in delay or immediate ineffective-

ness.'"
Id. at 590.
4
8 Id. at 585-86.
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foundation of successful analysis . ..
Third, if it is reasonably
probable that there will be a change in market structure which will
allow the exercise of substantially greater market power, then a prima
facie case has been made out under § 7. Fourth, where the case
against the merger rests on the probability of increased market power,
the merging companies may attempt to prove that there are countervailing economies reasonably probable which should be weighed against
the adverse effects. 49
Applying these criteria to the present merger, Mr. Justice Harlan
felt that the merger was violative of section 7 in that, since the
other firms looked to Clorox as a price leader, the newly acquired
advertising benefits would have an adverse effect upon competitive
resistance in the market. However, Mr. Justice Harlan clearly
indicated his belief that advertising power alone should not be
considered sufficient to find a section 7 violation.50
Thus, he
contended that, for future conglomerate litigation, the courts should
determine at what point advertising ceases to be an aspect of
healthy competition and becomes a weapon for anti-competitive
practices.
Thus, although exact definitive standards have not been
established in Procter, what has been decided appears to have
a great effect upon future section 7 litigation. Although the
decision follows the probability guidelines of Brown, the "potential
entrant" test of El Paso, and the "bigness" criteria of Reynolds,
Procter also establishes general criteria of its own. In relying
so heavily upon the expertise and advertising advantages of Procter,
the Court has, in effect, extended the "bigness" argument as it
was stated in Reynolds. There, the Court had been concerned
with wealth and size as it might have affected the merged companies'
ability to cut prices in an already oligopolistic market. Here,
however, the Court has emphasized "bigness" in the sense of
advertising power which would enable the acquiring firm to
effectively stifle competition, both actual and potential, in a market
almost entirely dependent on advertising capabilities. It should
be noted that since all liquid bleach is basically chemically
identical and since there are no close substitutes for this product,
the instant case presented an ideal situation in which to introduce
this "bigness"-in-advertising argument.
It is easy to visualize
the potential anti-competitive effects that a large-scale advertising
campaign by Procter on behalf of Clorox might have on the rest
of the bleach market. Thus, in its most limited application, the
"bigness" rationale of Procter would void mergers where the
acquired product possessed the twin characteristics of liquid

491d. at 598-99.
50 Id. at 603-04.
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bleach,"' i.e., substantial identity with other products on its market
with no available close substitutes and an acquirer who enjoyed
many advertising benefits. The Procter test might also be further
limited to areas in which the acquired firm was, prior to the
merger, a leader in its respective field.
However, since Procter appears to be the first case in which
the Supreme Court has attempted to establish criteria for evaluating
a true conglomerate merger, the question arises as to whether
the rationale of this decision will be expanded. For example, if a
fact pattern arises in which a national household product manufacturer merges with a shoe manufacturer, will the Procterrationale
support divestiture if the necessary requirements are established?
It would seem that an argument based upon the "bigness" test
announced in Reynolds, combined with potential advertising "bigness" as announced in the instant case, might be successful. Since
advertising is so important in all product markets, it would appear
that the benefits the shoe manufacturer would receive from the
well-established national firm with substantial advertising advantages
would enable it to effectively curtail competition, both actual and
potential.
It would seem that it is the lack of definitiveness in the
rationale that makes Procter supererogatory in effect. The Court
undoubtedly was aware of the natural tendency today of companies
to merge with others which have large advertising budgets in
order to gain competitive advantage. Firms such as General
Foods, Bristol-Meyers, Lever Brothers, Colgate-Palmolive, and
Gillette, all of whom have acquired and are continuing to acquire
new brands or products through substantial mergers, 52 will have
to continue to allow for the probability of challenge. Moreover,
the firms will still have to estimate the chance of an adverse legal
proceeding, since the instant case does not clearly establish
criteria sufficient to determine whether a conglomerate merger will
be anti-competitive under section 7.
In conclusion, the decision of the instant case, to some degree,
seems to be a return to the rationale that, in the anti-trust area,
bigness will be closely scrutinized. The net effect of this case
is that many of the large firms, rather than risk the cost of long
term litigation and potential orders of divestiture, will expand
internally. Moreover, due to the lack of definitive standards and
the lengthy procedures that will be necessary to prove anti-competitive effects under these standards, those firms which do merge will
be met with fragmentary enforcement of section 7. It would

51
52

Such products might include salt, gasoline and milk.
Blake & Blum, supra note 45, at 1372-73.
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appear that clear-cut violations of section 7 by means of conglomerate merger might be more readily challenged than those
situations which appear doubtful under the existing standards.

M
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw - WARRANTLESS ARREST AND SEARCH
ON THE BASIS OF INFORMER'S COMMUNICATION - PROSECUTION'S
PRE-TRIAL INVOCATION OF "INFORMER'S PRIVILEGE" HELD NOT
CONSTITUTIONALLY OBJECTIONABLE PER SE. - Acting on informa-

tion from a confidential informer that petitioner possessed narcotics,
two Illinois policemen arrested petitioner without a warrant, and
during a search of his person discovered a package of heroin.
Petitioner's motion to suppress the evidence of the heroin was
denied, and he was convicted of unlawful possession of narcotics.
On appeal, he contended that the hearing on his motion to suppress,
where probable cause for arrest was in issue, was constitutionally
defective since the judge had refused to compel identification of
the informer on whose "tip-off" petitioner was arrested. Rejecting
petitioner's claim, the United States Supreme Court held that in
a state pre-trial proceeding where the only issue is probable cause
for arrest, or search, police officers need not be required to disclose
the identity of an informer if the trial judge is convinced, by
evidence submitted in open court and subject to cross-examination,
that the officers did rely in good faith upon credible information
supplied by a reliable informant. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S.

300 (1967).
The informer has long been a familiar figure in the AngloAmerican legal system." So valuable is his role in law enforcement
that the courts have developed the "informer's privilege" 2 allowing

' See Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons,
and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091 (1951). The author comments
briefly on the early English practice of approvement. The approver, a party
arraigned on a charge of treason or felony, would confess his guilt, and,
in order to obtain a pardon, would offer to appeal and convict other criminals (appellees). The approver would be pardoned if the appellees were
found guilty, but was hanged if the appellees were acquitted.
2 Originating in the English courts, the "informer's privilege" was first
used to conceal the names of those who disclosed revenue frauds. Rex v.
Akers, 170 Eng. Rep. 850 (1790). See Note, An Informer's Tale:
Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE LJ. 206, 209
n.26 (1953).

